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are a strong indication that John Searle is wrong to have recently implied 
that no cultivated and interesting philosophers are currently discussing 
religious issues. Taliaferro's survey of the current vibrant philosophy of 
religion scene in the academy begins with the topic of science and religion. 
He then observes that contemporary philosophy of religion involves a re­
vival of the general approach to philosophy of religion taken by the Cam­
bridge Platonists (with discussions of the divine attributes and the theistic 
arguments). Taliaferro highlights the problem of evil in the philosophy 
of religion as a special case study. He then identifies recent instances of 
cordiality and friendship in some relationships between defenders and 
critics of religious belief. He closes the chapter with a look at the role of 
philosophy of religion outside the academy, especially in current debates 
about the place of religion in the public square.
The book has two appendices. One of them, "A Guide to Further Study," 
lists centers and societies, journals, and books dedicated to the practice 
of the philosophy of religion. The other, "Select Contemporary Philoso­
phers," contains four tables listing philosophers (by specific topics) who 
have done philosophical work in the general areas of (1) non-western and 
non-traditional religions and movements, (2) divine attributes, (3) theistic 
arguments, and (4) the problem of evil. Taliaferro also includes a select 
bibliography. Only a person with a thorough mastery of the field could 
have provided such complete and helpful lists -  indeed, could have writ­
ten such a valuable and useful book. Philosophers who practice or are 
merely interested in the philosophy of religion will find this book to be a 
rich and indispensable resource.
My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, by John Martin Fischer. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 250 plus Index. $45.00 (hardcover)
STEWART GOETZ, Ursinus College
John Martin Fischer is without question one of the leading spokespersons 
in contemporary philosophy of action for compatiblist views about free 
will, determinism, and moral responsibility. My Way is a collection of first- 
rate essays by Fischer that have all, except for one (the Introduction), been 
previously published in other places. The fourth essay in the collection 
was co-written with Mark Ravizza, while the ninth was co-authored by 
Eleonore Stump. In this review, I summarize some of the major ideas of 
My Way and then critically interact with a few of them.
Fischer offers us the philosophical view he terms 'semicompatibilism': 
determinism is incompatible with genuine metaphysical access to alterna­
tive possibilities, while being compatible with moral responsibility (p. 133). 
His primary motivation for defending semicompatilism is the belief that our 
fundamental standing as free and morally responsible agents should not de­
pend upon what science might or might not ultimately conclude about the 
truth of causal determinism (p. 138). (Fischer also is concerned about prob­
lems for our basic status as free and morally responsible agents that arise
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from theological considerations, but I ignore these problems in this review.) 
While Fischer acknowledges that someone might respond by saying that if 
science concludes causal determinism is true then so much the worse for our 
fundamental standing as free and morally responsible agents, he thinks such 
a response just has to be wrong: "How can something so basic, so important 
[as our basic freedom and moral responsibility], depend on something so 
fine and so abstruse [as theoretical physics and cosmology]" (p. 6).
Fischer acknowledges that we normally think of ourselves as having 
the kind of freedom (libertarian) that "involves genuine metaphysical ac­
cess to alternative possibilities" from which we choose (p. 6). Why think 
that determinism is incompatible with this kind of freedom? Fischer says 
that he is inclined to accept the Consequence Argument, which in phil­
osophical circles is associated with the work of Peter van Inwagen and 
effectively shows that determinism excludes alternative possibilities nec­
essary for libertarian freedom. The argument's power to convince is so 
strong because it is "so firmly rooted in common sense" (p. 7). So if we are 
determined, then there are no metaphysically accessible alternatives and 
no libertarian freedom of the will.
What about moral responsibility? Do we ordinarily think that it re­
quires metaphysically accessible alternative possibilities? Fischer thinks 
the answer to this question is 'Yes,' but what we ordinarily think about 
this issue is mistaken. Our mistake can be explained by distinguishing 
two kinds of control: regulative and guidance. Regulative control is just 
libertarian freedom with metaphysical access to alternative possibilities. 
Guidance control is compatibilist in nature and requires no such access 
to alternative possibilities. Fischer illustrates guidance control with an ex­
ample (p. 39). Assume that you are driving your car and use the steering 
wheel to guide it to the right. Unknown to you, the steering apparatus is 
broken is such a way that were you to try to turn the steering wheel to 
take the car in some other direction, the wheel would not turn and the car 
would continue to go to the right as it now does. Because you do not actu­
ally try to do anything other than turn the steering wheel to the right, the 
apparatus functions normally, and your guidance of the car is exactly as it 
would have been if the steering apparatus had functioned normally. While 
moral responsibility requires control of some kind and we ordinarily think 
this kind is regulative in nature, all that is needed is guidance control: 
"Whereas we may intuitively suppose that regulative control comes with 
guidance control, it is not, at a deep level, regulative control that grounds 
moral responsibility" (p. 40). Hence, while only guidance control is neces­
sary for moral responsibility, their close linkage in our thought leads to the 
mistaken belief that moral responsibility requires regulative control.
Those familiar with the literature on moral responsibility will quickly 
realize that the notion of guidance control is closely tied to Frankfurt-style 
counterexamples (FSCs) to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), 
where (one version of) PAP states that one is morally responsible for a 
choice at a time t only if one had metaphysically accessible alternative 
choices at t. A typical FSC is as follows: Black is a neurosurgeon who, 
when he operates on Jones's brain, inserts a mechanism that enables him 
(Black) to control what Jones chooses by means of a sophisticated com­
puter. Black wants Jones to vote for Bush and not to vote for Gore. If Jones
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were to show any inclination to choose to vote for Gore, then the mecha­
nism would be activated by the computer to cause Jones to choose to vote 
for Bush. As things turn out, Jones chooses to vote for Bush on his own 
(with guidance control over his choice and without the intervention of the 
mechanism). Moreover, it seems that Jones is morally responsible for his 
choice, even though he was not free to choose otherwise. "So the tradition­
al assumption of the association of moral responsibility . . . with control 
is quite correct. But it need not be the sort of control that involves alterna­
tive possibilities. The point that is supported by the Frankfurt-type cases 
is that the sort of control necessarily associated with moral responsibility 
for action is guidance control" (p. 40; Fischer's emphasis). Thus, while in­
tuitively we might think that regulative control always accompanies guid­
ance control and is required for moral responsibility for a choice, FSCs 
help to make clear that it is guidance control alone (without regulative 
control) that is required for moral responsibility for a choice.
Some might remain unconvinced by FSCs and insist that they do not 
exclude all alternative possibilities. For example, it is open to Jones to show 
an inclination to choose to vote for Gore. Fischer believes, however, that 
showing an inclination is not robust enough to ground (ascriptions of) mor­
al responsibility (p. 48). If an alternative possibility is relevant to moral re­
sponsibility for an actual choice this must be because that alternative is an 
action that an agent might have performed instead of the action which he 
did perform. Showing an inclination does not fit the bill. "On the traditional 
alternative possibilities picture, it is envisaged that an agent has a choice 
between two (or more) scenarios of a certain sort. . . . This is what is involved 
in having robust alternative possibilities, and certainly this is the natural 
way to think about the sort of alternative possibilities that allegedly ground 
moral responsibility" (pp. 46-47; Fischer's emphasis). And it is thoroughly 
implausible to think that an agent is morally responsible for an actual choice 
because it was possible that he show an inclination to choose otherwise. 
Such an alternative is no more than a flicker of freedom (pp. 40-50).
Fischer concludes that what he calls the 'indirect argument' for the view 
that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility is unsound. 
The indirect argument makes use of the premises that causal determinism 
excludes metaphysically accessible alternatives (regulative control) and 
that metaphysically accessible alternatives are required for moral respon­
sibility (PAP). Because FSCs undermine PAP, they undermine the argu­
ment that determinism excludes moral responsibility. There are, however, 
what Fischer terms 'direct arguments' for this incompatibility of deter­
minism and moral responsibility, where a direct argument is one that does 
not make use of PAP (p. 6). One kind of direct argument employs the Prin­
ciple of Transfer of Nonresponsibility, which is roughly the idea that if one 
is not morally responsible for p, and one is not morally responsible for 'if 
p, then q,' then one is not morally responsible for q. Fischer believes this 
type of direct argument is subject to counterexamples and is, therefore, no 
more successful than the indirect argument.
Some incompatibilists have opted for a different kind of direct argument 
against the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility. 
This argument makes use of the idea of sourcehood. Its proponents point 
out that while non-robust alternatives are not adequate to ground moral
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responsibility for an actual choice, they do serve as signs that causal de­
terminism is false. If there were no flickers of freedom, then causal deter­
minism would obtain and the agent would not originate, initiate, or be the 
robust source of his actual choice. While Fischer concedes that there is a 
strict sense of the idea of origination which entails the falsity of causal de­
terminism, there is no good reason to think that this strict sense of origina­
tion is required for moral responsibility. A less strict, compatibilist notion 
of origination will suffice for moral responsibility. Thus, "apart from a reli­
ance on the requirement of regulative control, how could it be argued that 
the relevant notion of origination must be indeterministic?" (p. 16)
As Fischer states, "[a] lot, then, is at stake in evaluating the Frankfurt- 
type examples" (p. 40). If FSCs are successful, then "[t]he dialectical ter­
rain has shifted in a way that is felicitous for compatibilism" (p. 17). This 
terrain is supposedly more felicitous for compatibilism because the debate 
about the compatibility or incompatibility of moral responsibility with de­
terminism has shifted from a context in which metaphysically accessible 
alternative possibilities are the focus to one where the actual sequence of 
events is front and center (p. 138). One might be tempted to think that this 
advantageous movement has occurred because FSCs make clear in one 
fell swoop that an agent like Jones is morally responsible for his choice 
even though he is determined to choose as he does. Fischer thinks that 
Frankfurt-style compatibilists (compatibilists who make argumentative 
use of FSCs) should not, and need not, think this way. Rather, they should 
use FSCs in a two-step argument in support of the view that Jones is mor­
ally responsible. The first step is to argue from FSCs that metaphysically 
accessible alternative possibilities (alternative choices) are irrelevant for 
moral responsibility. Thus, if Jones is not morally responsible for choos­
ing to vote for Bush, this is not because he was not free to choose to vote 
for Gore. After the first step, the Frankfurt-style compatibilist should and 
need only say that "I don't know at this point whether [Jones] is morally 
responsible for his [choice], but if  he is not, it is not because he lacks alter­
native possibilities" (p. 128; Fischer's emphases).
The second step is to consider whether it is plausible to think that caus­
al determinism in the actual sequence of events directly or in and of itself 
(without reference to metaphysically accessible alternative possibilities) 
excludes moral responsibility. Not surprisingly, Fischer concludes that it 
does not. While certain kinds of causal determinism rule out moral respon­
sibility (e.g., those kinds that involve unconsented-to covert manipulation 
by other agents), others do not. There are "plausible ways of distinguish­
ing between objectionable sorts of manipulation and mere causal deter­
mination" (p. 132). On Fischer's view, causal determinism of an agent's 
action that issues from a reasons-sensitive mechanism which is owned by 
the agent is compatible with moral responsibility for that action.
There are many more important issues in this important and challeng­
ing book, but a reviewer must draw the line somewhere, if he is to leave 
any space to engage the author's ideas. Therefore, I turn to a critical ex­
amination of some of the ideas I have summarized. I begin with Fischer's 
claim that "[t]he dialectical terrain has shifted in a way that is felicitous 
for compatibilism" (p. 17). As I have pointed out elsewhere ("Frankfurt- 
Style Counterexample and Begging the Question": henceforth, FSCBQ),"1
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it is difficult to see how the dialectical terrain has shifted at all. This is be­
cause (again, see FSCBQ) Fischer's two-step argument begs the question 
against the incompatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility. 
It does so because the FSC on which it depends assumes the truth of 
causal determinism in the actual sequence of events. Hence, the two-step 
argument shows the alleged irrelevance of alternative possibilities for 
moral responsibility only by assuming the truth of determinism.
Since the publication of My Way, which includes Fischer's response to 
my argument in FSCBQ (pp. 198-201), Fischer has come to agree that the 
argument in FSCBQ about begging the question is correct. Can the com- 
patibilist put together any non-question-begging argument against the 
libertarian that will shift the terrain in favor of the former? A compatibil- 
ist like Fischer who believes that so much hinges on FSCs might try to 
construct one that does not beg the question against the libertarian. The 
literature is filled with such attempts and libertarian responses to them. 
If it should (continue to) turn out that all such attempts either clearly beg 
the question or are so controversial that the charge that they beg the ques­
tion is at least as plausible as the attempts themselves, then perhaps it 
would be wise to reconsider the relationship between determinism and 
alternative possibilities. As I suggested in FSCBQ, perhaps we should not 
be surprised that an FSC begs the question against the libertarian because 
as a matter of fact determinism and the lack of alternative possibilities are 
really just the same thing. In FSCBQ, I tried to muster some support for 
their identity by citing van Inwagen's concept of determinism. Van Inwa- 
gen defines 'determinism' as "the thesis that there is at any instant exactly 
one physically possible future."2 If one is a little more permissive than van 
Inwagen and allows for the possibility of a nonphysical as well as a physi­
cal future, to say that at any instant there is one and only one possible 
future is to say that at any instant there are no alternative possible futures. 
Thus, if we let 'D' represent determinism and '~AP' represent 'no alterna­
tive possible futures,' D just is ~AP. One possibility this identity of D and 
~AP raises is that PAP is identical with what we can call 'the principle of 
determinism' or 'PD,' which is that determinism directly (i.e., without go­
ing through PAP, where PAP is distinct from PD) entails the lack of moral 
responsibility (a person is morally responsible for his choice at a time t 
only if he was not determined at t to choose as he did). Given this identity 
between PAP and PD, it seems wrong to assume that libertarians must 
arrive at PD indirectly by means of PAP. They need not but can directly 
assent to both PAP and PD because they are the same principle.
Is there any reason to think that PAP and PD are identical, where this 
reason is something other than the intuition that they are the same thing? 
Harry Frankfurt briefly mentions the possibility that D and ~AP are identi­
cal, and thus that a person is not morally responsible for his choice simply 
because it was causally determined.3 He also adds that he does not find the 
suggestions that D is identical with ~AP acceptable. He asks us to consider 
a person who tells us that he did what he did because he was unable to 
do otherwise or because he had (was determined) to do it. Frankfurt notes 
that we often accept these statements as valid excuses, and such state­
ments may at first glance seem to support the identity of D and ~AP. But 
he believes that our acceptance of them presupposes a belief in more than
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what is said literally. "We understand the person who offers the excuse 
to mean that he did what he did only because he was unable to do other­
wise, or only because he had to do it. And we understand him to mean . . . 
that when he did what he did it was not because that was what he really 
wanted to do."4 Frankfurt's attempt to explain away what is literally said 
is suspect for at least two reasons. First, a person who tells us he did what 
he did because he was unable to do otherwise or because he had to do it 
might very well have wanted to do what he did, believed that he ought 
not do what he wanted to do, and not have done what he did except for 
the fact that he was unable not to do it because he was determined to do it. 
Second, a person might very well utter these words in a context where his 
wanting to do something that is good deterministically led to his doing it. 
Because he knows this was the case, he is insisting that he does not deserve 
any praise or reward for doing what he did.
As I stated in FSCBQ, I do not know how to resolve the question about 
the identity of D and ~AP in any non-question-begging way. But I also 
do not think that there is a non-question-begging argument against a 
compatibilist view of determinism, alternative possibilities, and moral 
responsibility and in support of a libertarian view of these matters. Bor­
rowing some terminology from Fischer, I believe that when we come to 
the issues of freedom, moral responsibility, determinism, and alternative 
possibilities we ultimately reach a "dialectical stalemate" (pp. 166-67). But 
even though Fischer's way with regard to these issues is not my way, I am 
happy to say that My Way is a wonderful collection of essays by a superb 
philosopher. It is a book well worth reading.
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